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We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barber?Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582717
characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572210
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494475
The paper investigates teachers' decisions to leave the profession. First we examine the role of earnings and earnings in alternative occupations in these decisions, and then the paper discusses how the public sector wage increase in 2002 has effected exiting decisions of teachers. Using large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494743
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009376803
The paper investigates teachers' decisions to leave the profession. First we examine the role of earnings and earnings in alternative occupations in these decisions, and then the paper discusses how the public sector wage increase in 2002 has effected exiting decisions of teachers. Using large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009719071
This article considers the relationship between centralised, exogenous institutions and the embedded, endogenous institutions of rural governance in Europe through an examination of the evaluation procedures of the European LEADER programme. LEADER is presented in the literature as progressive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494412
This article considers the relationship between centralised, exogenous institutions and the embedded, endogenous institutions of rural governance in Europe through an examination of the evaluation procedures of the European LEADER programme. LEADER is presented in the literature as progressive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003919695
We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823881
One of the aims of the new electoral law of Hungary has been to define a fairer apportionment into voting districts … Matters of the Venice Commission. These rules fix the average size of the voting districts, require voting districts not to … term: increase the number of voting districts to about 130, allow the number of voting districts to change flexibly at each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009628411