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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000746157
I model the hypothesis that preferences evolve and permanent differences in individual attitudes towards work emerge between two countries characterized initially by identical preferences as a result of a period in which only one of the two countries is subject to regulations constraining labor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005628832
In this study, we use two representative surveysto investigate how competition and cooperation relate on the individual level and whether (and how) they associate with educational attainment. Our first result is that the correlation between competition and cooperation is positive and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012604937
Sorting into public sector jobs may be motivated not only by the available income but also by other aspects, such as stronger demand for security or for social usefulness. The demand for larger job security - beside other factors - can be the consequence of family circumstances. We have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494736
Sorting into public sector jobs may be motivated not only by the available income but also by other aspects, such as stronger demand for security or for social usefulness. The demand for larger job security - beside other factors - can be the consequence of family circumstances. We have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009719060
In this study, we use two representative surveysto investigate how competition and cooperation relate on the individual level and whether (and how) they associate with educational attainment. Our first result is that the correlation between competition and cooperation is positive and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012546380
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000836986
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001224526
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001239492
The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008668694