In this study, we use two representative surveysto investigate how competition and cooperation relate on the individual level and whether (and how) they associate with educational attainment. Our first result is that the correlation between competition and cooperation is positive and...

Sorting into public sector jobs may be motivated not only by the available income but also by other aspects, such as stronger demand for security or for social usefulness. The demand for larger job security - beside other factors - can be the consequence of family circumstances. We have...

Sorting into public sector jobs may be motivated not only by the available income but also by other aspects, such as stronger demand for security or for social usefulness. The demand for larger job security - beside other factors - can be the consequence of family circumstances. We have...

In this study, we use two representative surveysto investigate how competition and cooperation relate on the individual level and whether (and how) they associate with educational attainment. Our first result is that the correlation between competition and cooperation is positive and...

The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted...

The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted...

We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide a political decision-maker with policy-relevant information and to exert pressure on her. Both activities are costly but may induce the lobby's preferred policy. Our paper provides an integrated analysis of both lobbying activities and...

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions...