The aim of this study is to review what we know about depositors' behavior, using empirical observations and experimental data. I find that both fundamental problems and coordination failures between depositors explain depositors' behavior and therefore the emergence of bank runs. I show that...

The aim of this study is to review what we know about depositors' behavior, using empirical observations and experimental data. I find that both fundamental problems and coordination failures between depositors explain depositors' behavior and therefore the emergence of bank runs. I show that...

In this paper, the authors characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N \ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs...

We show that for any market-clearing price, average profits in a symmetric industry cannot exceed the individual profits from the Walrasian output. This immediately implies that a firm itself can guarantee to beat the market by producing the Walrasian output. This property clarifies and...

The so called classic model of tax compliance behaviour interprets the problem as an individual decision under risk made by a single taxpayer. After a concise description of this model our literature survey investigates whether the empirical results found in the literature corroborate the...

The so called classic model of tax compliance behaviour interprets the problem as an individual decision under risk made by a single taxpayer. After a concise description of this model our literature survey investigates whether the empirical results found in the literature corroborate the...

Economic decisions have been shown to depend on actual outcomes as well as perceived intentions. In this paper, we examine whether and how the relative importance of outcomes or intentions for economic decision develops with age. We report the result of ultimatum games with children, teens and...

The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted...