The most fundamental form of systemic risk in modern financial networks is contagion. In this article we describe a homogeneous banking system (banks with identical preferences and the same size of total assets) with interconnectedness: banks own shares in each others' assets. Using these...

Game theory is the pocket knife of conflict modelling: it has tools, models for practically all strategic conflicts, be that two- or multiplayer, complete or incomplete information and so on. In this study we have collected relevant tools for young lawyers. Since this is an introductory text we...

Game theory is the pocket knife of conflict modelling: it has tools, models for practically all strategic conflicts, be that two- or multiplayer, complete or incomplete information and so on. In this study we have collected relevant tools for young lawyers. Since this is an introductory text we...

The most fundamental form of systemic risk in modern financial networks is contagion. In this article we describe a homogeneous banking system (banks with identical preferences and the same size of total assets) with interconnectedness: banks own shares in each others' assets. Using these...

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions...

We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in an unequal society. A majoritarian democracy redistributes resources from the collectivity toward relatively few people, and has a relatively small government and low level of...

We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide a political decision-maker with policy-relevant information and to exert pressure on her. Both activities are costly but may induce the lobby's preferred policy. Our paper provides an integrated analysis of both lobbying activities and...

The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted...

One of the aims of the new electoral law of Hungary has been to define a fairer apportionment into voting districts. This is ensured by a set of rules slightly more premissive than those laid out in the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission. These rules fix the...