We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions...

The macroeconomic reasons for the recent banking crises in the Nordic countries are analysed using an econometric model estimated with panel data from the 1980s and 1990s. Two alternative dependent variables are used: the ratio of banks’ loan losses to lending and enterprise bankruptcies per...

This paper examines the major economic and institutional factors underlying the surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Mexico during the 1990s. It presents evidence that indicates that market-friendly economic reforms and major changes in the institutional-legal status of foreign...

The so called classic model of tax compliance behaviour interprets the problem as an individual decision under risk made by a single taxpayer. After a concise description of this model our literature survey investigates whether the empirical results found in the literature corroborate the...

The so called classic model of tax compliance behaviour interprets the problem as an individual decision under risk made by a single taxpayer. After a concise description of this model our literature survey investigates whether the empirical results found in the literature corroborate the...

This article considers the relationship between centralised, exogenous institutions and the embedded, endogenous institutions of rural governance in Europe through an examination of the evaluation procedures of the European LEADER programme. LEADER is presented in the literature as progressive...

This article considers the relationship between centralised, exogenous institutions and the embedded, endogenous institutions of rural governance in Europe through an examination of the evaluation procedures of the European LEADER programme. LEADER is presented in the literature as progressive...

The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted...