The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted...

The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted...

As part of a process of democratization, many countries spanning Europe, Latin Amertica, Africa, and Asia are reorganizing their governments by devolving fiscal responsibility and authority to newly empowered regional and local governments. Although decentralization in each country proceeds...

This paper shows that actual systems of intergovernmental transfers are incompletely specified when viewed as mechanisms that operate over time, and that the norms of evolution most frequently used do not preserve the distributive properties they have at their initial position. We argue that...

Este trabajo aplica la norma de evolución HEAVE, desarrollada en el artículo previo del autor Dynamic Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Intergovernmental Transfers http://iei.uv.es:80/index.php?opcion=publicaciones, al sistema español de financiación autonómica y compara los resultados con...