This article considers the relationship between centralised, exogenous institutions and the embedded, endogenous institutions of rural governance in Europe through an examination of the evaluation procedures of the European LEADER programme. LEADER is presented in the literature as progressive...

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions...

This article considers the relationship between centralised, exogenous institutions and the embedded, endogenous institutions of rural governance in Europe through an examination of the evaluation procedures of the European LEADER programme. LEADER is presented in the literature as progressive...

The aim of this study is to review what we know about depositors' behavior, using empirical observations and experimental data. I find that both fundamental problems and coordination failures between depositors explain depositors' behavior and therefore the emergence of bank runs. I show that...

The aim of this study is to review what we know about depositors' behavior, using empirical observations and experimental data. I find that both fundamental problems and coordination failures between depositors explain depositors' behavior and therefore the emergence of bank runs. I show that...