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players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion … or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted voting games, where the value of a coalition is a random variable. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008668694
players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion … or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted voting games, where the value of a coalition is a random variable. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494447
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001036900
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001235679
We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide a political decision-maker with policy-relevant information and to exert pressure on her. Both activities are costly but may induce the lobby's preferred policy. Our paper provides an integrated analysis of both lobbying activities and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342190
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001689954
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001738821
The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded to Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström for their work on contract theory. Contract theory is a subfield of game theory where the conflict between the owner - the principal - and the CEO - or agent - is at the centre of interest. In the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011944900
The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded to Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström for their work on contract theory. Contract theory is a subfield of game theory where the conflict between the owner - the principal - and the CEO - or agent - is at the centre of interest. In the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011588720
In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247843