Economists and lawyers are badly divided on issues concerning tying and bundling. Permissivie and prohibitive attitudes are changing radically in the literature and in the legal practice. After a short discurse on the notions, we introduce the basic ideas, theories and debates according to...

Economists and lawyers are badly divided on issues concerning tying and bundling. Permissivie and prohibitive attitudes are changing radically in the literature and in the legal practice. After a short discurse on the notions, we introduce the basic ideas, theories and debates according to...

This paper reports an experiment that studies the behavior of a monopolist on sequential auction markets for tradable permits. Using six sessions in a triple ABA crossover design, we investigate the cost-effectiveness of permit allocations and the division of trade gains on sequential bid,...

In this paper, the authors characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N \ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs...

We show that for any market-clearing price, average profits in a symmetric industry cannot exceed the individual profits from the Walrasian output. This immediately implies that a firm itself can guarantee to beat the market by producing the Walrasian output. This property clarifies and...