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Equity grants to target CEOs during deal negotiations

Heitzman, Shane - In: Journal of Financial Economics 102 (2011) 2, pp. 251-271

I investigate the determinants and consequences of granting equity to the target's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) during deal negotiations. These negotiation grants likely reflect information about the acquisition, benefit from the deal premium, and provide more timely bargaining incentives. I...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010571669

CEO compensation and corporate risk: Evidence from a natural experiment

Gormley, Todd A.; Matsa, David A.; Milbourn, Todd - In: Journal of Accounting and Economics 56 (2013) 2, pp. 79-101

This paper examines the two-way relationship between managerial compensation and corporate risk by exploiting an unanticipated change in firms' business risks. The natural experiment provides an opportunity to examine two classic questions related to incentives and risk—how boards adjust...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043084

CEO wage dynamics: Estimates from a learning model

Taylor, Lucian A. - In: Journal of Financial Economics 108 (2013) 1, pp. 79-98

The level of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay responds asymmetrically to good and bad news about the CEO's ability. The average CEO captures approximately half of the surpluses from good news, implying CEOs and shareholders have roughly equal bargaining power. In contrast, the average CEO bears...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011039267

Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers

Burkart, Mike; Raff, Konrad - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by offering acquisition opportunities to successful … performance-based pay are non-monotonic in the intensity of the takeover threat. In firms with weak boards, turnover (performance …-based pay) increases (decreases) with the intensity of the takeover threat. When choosing its acquisition policy and the quality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083799

Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss

Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004

A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256032

The Effects of Performance Measurement and Compensation on Motivation

Herpen, Marco van; Praag, C. Mirjam van; Cools, Kees - Tinbergen Institute - 2003

This paper analyzes empirically the relationship between pay and performance. Economic and psychological theories predict that the design and implementation of a performance measurement and compensation system affect the motivation of employees. Our survey results demonstrate a positive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144489

Job Satisfaction for Employees: Evidence from Karachi Electric Supply Corporation

Nousheen; Herani, Gobind M.; Mahmud, Mohammad; Tariq, … - In: KASBIT Journal of Management & Social Science 2 (2009) December, pp. 95-104

Research has been conducted in order to critically evaluate and examine the level of employees’ satisfaction as well as the factors of dissatisfaction among the employees of Karachi Electric supply Corporation (KESC). The purpose of this study is also to observe and analyze the factors which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010837159

Job Satisfaction for Employees: Evidence from Karachi Electric Supply Corporation

Nousheen; Herani, Gobind M.; Mahmud, Mohammad; Tariq, … - In: KASBIT Journal of Management & Social Science 2 (2009) 1, pp. 95-104

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010638813

What can we learn from privately held firms about executive compensation?

Cole, Rebel; Mehran, Hamid - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

This study examines the determinants of CEO compensation using data from a nationally representative sample of privately held U.S. corporations. We find that: (i) the pay-size elasticity is much larger for privately held firms than for the publicly traded firms on which previous research has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005836210

Job Satisfaction for Employees: Evidence from Karachi Electric Supply Corporation

Frukh, Nousjheen; Herani, Gobind M.; Mohammad, Mahmud; … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545942