Showing 1 - 7 of 7
Italian Abstract: Vengono esposti i tradizionali modelli di oligopolio con bene omogeneo a mosse simultanee, sequenziali e colllusive, con variabile strategica quantità o prezzo. L'utilizzo di funzioni lineari permette di calcolare e comparare tutte le soluzioni
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857077
In the real world, many social and economic interactions are highly affected by coordination problems. These, in turn, emerge from the trial to dynamically organize strategies of collective action in complex contexts where agents and groups are heterogeneous and information is only imperfectly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008592925
A new axiomatic characterization of the two-step Shapley value (Kamijo, 2009) is presented based on a solidarity principle of the members of any union: when the game changes due to the addition or deletion of players outside the union, all members of the union will share the same gains/losses.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008455642
The present paper builds on Arrighetti e Curatolo, 2009, 2010 by introducing heterogeneous opportunists into an agent-based simulated world populated by heterogeneous loyal agents playing a repeated coordination game. On average, opportunistic exploitation of economic resources lowers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008562560
Italian Abstract: Vengono esposti i principi base della teoria delle aste. Quali le questioni da risolvere, quali ingredienti, quali ipotesi necessarie per semplificare una teoria altrimenti piuttosto complessa. Vengono sviluppati i meccanismi d'asta al I e al II prezzo, risolvendo per le...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013012341
Italian Abstract: L'obiettivo è dare al lettore gli strumenti per costruire e risolvere il problema di puro scambio, utilizzando la scatola di Edgeworth. I due teoremi del benessere sono dimostrati euristicamente attraverso semplici calcoli
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141699
In this paper we present and solve some bargaining games a la Rubinstein, where the subjects can delegate the negotiating process to agents. Delegation is a possible commitment tactic. Its aim is to provide the delegating party with a higher bargaining power. When both the parties delegate,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005685641