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Living in Two Neighborhoods – Social Interaction Effects in the Lab
Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs; Gaechter, Simon - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2009
behavior in a coordination game with multiple equilibria and a public goods game, which has only one equilibrium in material …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150913
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Living in Two Neighborhoods – Social Interaction Effects in the Lab
Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs; Gaechter, Simon - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2009
behavior in a coordination game with multiple equilibria and a public goods game, which has only one equilibrium in material …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552229
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It's all about Connections: Evidence on Network Formation
Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
We present an economic experiment on network formation, in which subjects can decide to form links to one another. Direct links are costly but being connected is valuable. The game-theoretic basis for our experiment is the model of Bala and Goyal (2000). They distinguish between two scenarios...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005760915
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It's all about Connections: Evidence on Network Formation
Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2003
We present an economic experiment on network formation, in which subjects can decide to form links to one another. Direct links are costly but being connected is valuable. The gametheoretic basis for our experiment is the model of Bala and Goyal (2000). They distinguish between two scenarios...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761658
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It's All About Connections: Evidence on Network Formation
Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
We present an economic experiment on network formation, in which subjects can decide to form links to one another. Direct links are costly but being connected is valuable. The game-theoretic basis for our experiment is the model of Bala and Goyal (2000). They distinguish between two scenarios...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792485
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A Theory of Reciprocity
Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
This Paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind … ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by … the intention underlying this action. The theory explains the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791797
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Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation
Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
In this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123667
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Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation
Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
In this paper we show that a simple model of reciprocal preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585660
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Eigennutz kontra Reziprozität: Befunde und Implikationen
Falk, Armin - In: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG 28 (2002) 3, pp. 383-402
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010704977