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Some results on the weak core of a non-side-payment game with infinitely many players
Weber, S. - In: Journal of mathematical economics 8 (1981) 11, pp. 101-111
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002986383
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Stable Coalition Structure with Unidimensional Set of Alternatives.
Greenberg, J.; Weber, S. - Department of Economics, York University - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005625407
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Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Game with Positive Externalities.
Le Breton, M.; Konishi, H.; Weber, S. - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative … - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634433
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A Note on the Core and von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions of Simple Games.
Le Breton, M.; Weber, S. - Department of Economics, York University - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005474941
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Sequential Arbitration Procedures.
Weber, S.; Kilgour, M.; Brams, S.J. - Department of Economics, York University - 1990
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005474946
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Equivalence of Strong and Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in Games without Spillovers.
Le Breton, M.; Konishi, H.; Weber, S. - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative … - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005479061
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Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games.
Le Breton, M.; Owen, G.; Weber, S. - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative … - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005479086
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Strong Equilibrium in a Model with Partial Rivalry.
Le Breton, M.; Weber, S. - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative … - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669468
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Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games.
Le Breton, M.; Owen, G.; Weber, S. - Department of Economics, York University - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005660989