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Measuring Social Norms and Preferences using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists

Camerer, Colin F.; Fehr, Ernst - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

Experimental games turned out to be remarkably productive tools for examining the nature of social preferences and social norms. This paper describes the methods and tools of experimental game theory and provides a selection of games that have been useful. We also discuss the role of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585655

Evidence for countercyclical risk aversion: an experiment with financial professionals

Cohn, Alain; Engelmann, Jan; Fehr, Ernst; Maréchal, … - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2013

A key ingredient of many popular asset pricing models is that investors exhibit countercyclical risk aversion, which … helps explain major economic puzzles such as the strong and systematic variation in risk premiums over time and the high … problems by priming financial professionals with either a boom or a bust scenario and by subsequently measuring their risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240398

Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental Games : A Guide for Social Scientists

Camerer, Colin - 2006

Experimental games turned out to be remarkably productive tools for examining the nature of social preferences and social norms. This paper describes the methods and tools of experimental gametheory and provides a selection of games that have been useful. We also discuss the role of evolutionary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012735654

Fairness, Errors and the Power of Competition

Fischbacher, Urs - 2004

One of the most basic questions in economics concerns the effects of competition on market prices. We show that the neglect of both fairness concerns and decision errors prevents a satisfactory understanding of how competition affects prices. We conducted experiments which demonstrate that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012738637

Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation?

Fehr, Ernst - 2004

In this paper we provide experimental evidence indicating that incentive contracts may undermine voluntary cooperation. This suggests that explicit incentives may have costly side effects that have been largely neglected by economists. In our experiments the undermining effect is so strong that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012739101

Psychological Foundations of Incentives

Fehr, Ernst - 2004

During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation. The purpose of this paper is to show that this narrow view of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012739138

Testing Theories of Fairness - Intentions Matter

Falk, Armin - 2004

Recently developed models of fairness can explain a wide variety of seemingly contradictory facts. The most controversial and yet unresolved issue in the modeling of fairness preferences concerns the behavioral relevance of fairness intentions. Intuitively, fairness intentions seem to play an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012739184

Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental Games : A Guide for Social Scientists

Camerer, Colin - 2006

Experimental games turned out to be remarkably productive tools for examining the nature of social preferences and social norms. This paper describes the methods and tools of experimental gametheory and provides a selection of games that have been useful. We also discuss the role of evolutionary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012783926

Use and Abuse of Authority

Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210890

THE HIDDEN COSTS AND RETURNS OF INCENTIVES — TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS AMONG CEOs

Fehr, Ernst; List, John A. - EconWPA - 2004

We examine experimentally how Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) respond to incentives and how they provide incentives in situations requiring trust and trustworthiness. As a control we compare the behavior of CEOs with the behavior of students. We find that CEOs are considerably more trusting and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076520