We study experimentally a standard four-player Hotelling game, with a uniform density of consumers and inelastic demand. The pure strategy Nash equilibrium configuration consists of two firms located at one quarter of the ``linear city'', and the other two at three quarters. We do not observe...

For any political party wishing to keep the governance of the country, it is crucial to understand the power that each of the other parties can bring to its coalition. This evaluation helps to understand the bargaining power of each party individually. Furthermore, it allows a party to evaluate...

The objective of this paper is to analyze, with the instruments of Game Theory, the incentives that can lead a Member State of the European Union to disregard the Stability and Growth Pact, and thus, to keep an excessive deficit, although aware of the political and financial risk associated with...

Leniency programs have shown to be an important tool to fight cartels. By reducing fees or guaranteeing imunity against criminal prosecution, leniency programs provide incentives to cartelized firms to reveal the cartel activities. We reveal the recent literature on leniency programs as well as...

We apply the random fields framework proposed by Durlauf (1997) and Brock and Durlauf (2001) to a non-cooperative game of binary choices. We extend their model to allow for a more general distribution of the economic agents heterogeneity, in accordance with Glaeser and Scheinckman (2001). We...