We apply the random fields framework proposed by Durlauf (1997) and Brock and Durlauf (2001) to a non-cooperative game of binary choices. We extend their model to allow for a more general distribution of the economic agents heterogeneity, in accordance with Glaeser and Scheinckman (2001). We...

In this paper we compare the costs of two regulatory policies about the entry of new firms. We consider an incumbent firm that has more information about the market demand than the regulator. Then, the incumbent firm can use this advantage to persuade the regulator to make entry more difficult....

The cease-and-desist commitment (CCP, a mechanism equivalent to a Consent Decree in the United States) is an agreement between the Administrative Counsel of Concurrence Defense (CADE) and an anticompetitive firm, aiming to cease the investigated practice in a certain period of time. During this...

In order to stimulate the quality of the service, ANEEL introduced penalties in the contracts with the concessionaires of public services of transmission of electric energy in the case which the transmission facilities are turned off, be for accident or for maintenance. In this sense, a variable...

We study experimentally a standard four-player Hotelling game, with a uniform density of consumers and inelastic demand. The pure strategy Nash equilibrium configuration consists of two firms located at one quarter of the ``linear city'', and the other two at three quarters. We do not observe...