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We consider a leader and a subordinate he appoints who engage in team production. The public observes the organization’s performance, but is unable to determine the separate contributions of the leader and of the subordinate. The leader may therefore claim credit for the good work of his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190898
Neste trabalho o método de opções reais foi utilizado, em confronto com o do valor presente líquido, para avaliar se uma parte do Parque dos Manguezais, em Recife-PE, maior área de manguezal urbano do mundo, deve ou não ser utilizada para construção de uma rodovia, se sua totalidade deve...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008516686
endogenous number of firms and varieties, sticky prices and financial markets incompleteness. We show that these features are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008913278
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566128
The cease-and-desist commitment (CCP, a mechanism equivalent to a Consent Decree in the United States) is an agreement between the Administrative Counsel of Concurrence Defense (CADE) and an anticompetitive firm, aiming to cease the investigated practice in a certain period of time. During this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085782
The objective of this paper is to analyze, with the instruments of Game Theory, the incentives that can lead a Member State of the European Union to disregard the Stability and Growth Pact, and thus, to keep an excessive deficit, although aware of the political and financial risk associated with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968484
Leniency programs have shown to be an important tool to fight cartels. By reducing fees or guaranteeing imunity against criminal prosecution, leniency programs provide incentives to cartelized firms to reveal the cartel activities. We reveal the recent literature on leniency programs as well as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968561
We apply the random fields framework proposed by Durlauf (1997) and Brock and Durlauf (2001) to a non-cooperative game of binary choices. We extend their model to allow for a more general distribution of the economic agents heterogeneity, in accordance with Glaeser and Scheinckman (2001). We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968581