We consider a leader and a subordinate he appoints who engage in team production. The public observes the organization’s performance, but is unable to determine the separate contributions of the leader and of the subordinate. The leader may therefore claim credit for the good work of his...

In this paper we compare the costs of two regulatory policies about the entry of new firms. We consider an incumbent firm that has more information about the market demand than the regulator. Then, the incumbent firm can use this advantage to persuade the regulator to make entry more difficult....

This working paper is an initial effort to analyze theoretical contributions from New Institutional Economics (NEI), specially the Transaction Costs framework, for understanding financial mechanisms to innovation. Transaction Costs economy is one hand from firm’s contractual theories that...

Portuguese Abstract: O consenso da literatura é o de que o baixo nível de enforcement dos contratos e garantias seja uma causa importante do alto spread bancário no Brasil. No entanto, por conta de uma dinâmica de causalidade reversa, pode haver uma endogeneidade na estimação deste efeito...

Portuguese Abstract: O objetivo deste artigo é avaliar a "Metodologia para Determinação do Fator X" proposta pela ARSESP para a Revisão Tarifária do Setor de Distribuição de Gás Natural, no terceiro ciclo tarifário. A correta determinação do Fator X é de fundamental importância no...