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Growth of Electoral Fraud in Non-Democracies: The Role of Uncertainty

Vorobyev, Dmitriy - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2010

Electoral fraud has become an integral part of electoral competition both in established democracies and less-than-democratic regimes. In this paper I study electoral fraud in the non-democratic setting. First, I present evidence of fraud sustainability and growth over the lifetime of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008751894

Participation in Fraudulent Elections

Vorobyev, Dmitriy - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2014

I analyze a costly voting model of elections, in which the incumbent can stuff the ballot box, to investigate how electoral fraud affects the participation decisions of voters. I find that two stable equilibria may exist: first, a full abstention equilibrium, where the incumbent wins with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010842888

Storable Votes

Casella, Alessandra - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Motivated by the need for more flexible decision-making mechanisms in the European Union, the paper proposes a simple but novel voting scheme for binary decisions taken by committees that meet regularly over time. At each meeting, committee members are allowed to store their vote for future use;...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067626

Government corruption and legislative procedures: is one chamber better than two?

Testa, Cecilia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2003

This paper studies the impact of the competition between lobbies and voters on policy outcomes under alternative legislative procedures. Lobbies and citizens have opposing interests in a public policy and offer money and votes, respectively, to legislators to obtain their preferred policy....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928625

Bribing Voters

Bo, Ernesto Dal - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

We show how an outside party offering incentives to voters can manipulate at no cost collective decisions made through voting. Under influence, these decisions can become inefficient. Therefore, the market for policies may be more likely to fail than the markets for goods, because (democratic)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604871

Corruption scandals, press reporting, and accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors

Costas-Pérez, Elena; Solé-Ollé, Albert; … - Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB), Facultat … - 2011

We analyse the effects of local corruption on electoral outcomes with Spanish data. Based upon press reports published … between 1996 and 2009, we are able to construct a novel database on corruption scandals and news related to bribe-taking in … exchange for amendments to land use plans. Our data show that local corruption scandals first emerged during the 1999-2003 term …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024622