This article analyzes a simple two period model where two homogenous manufacturers compete to supply a monopolist retailer. We show that if manufacturers are vulnerable (i.e if they are likely to exit the market in case of insufficient orders in the first period) they may exploit their threat of...

This article analyzes a simple two-period model where two homogenous manufacturers compete to supply a monopolist retailer. We show that if manufacturers are vulnerable (i.e if they are likely to exit the market in case of insufficient orders in the first period), they may exploit their threat...

Cet article analyse un jeu simple à deux périodes dans lequel deux producteurs fabriquant un bien homogène se font concurrence pour fournir un distributeur. Les auteurs montrent que si les producteurs sont vulnérables (c’est-à-dire s’ils sont exclus du marché en cas d’une commande...