We characterize the equilibrium in a homogeneous good Cournot duopoly in which firms have the choice to react to a cost …

Cournot equilibria may be reversed. We prove this result within a static oligopolistic game in which both supply function … competition and Cournot competition yield a unique Nash equilibrium, whereas price setting yields a continuum of Nash equilibria …. There are parameter regions in which Bertrand profits are higher than Cournot ones, with the latter being higher than in the …

This paper aims at participating in the long-lasting debate about the analytical foundations of the Cournot equilibrium …. In a homogeneous oligopoly, under standard regularity conditions, we prove that Cournot-Nash emerges both under (i) price … competition and Cournot conjectures; and (ii) supply function competition with ex post market clearing. We demonstrate both …

We analyse optimal penal codes in both Bertrand and Cournot supergames with product differentiation. We prove that the … firms are price setters. Finally, we show that Abreu's rule cannot be implemented under Cournot behaviour and strong demand …

Within a simple model of homogeneous oligopoly, we show that the traditional ranking between Bertrand and Cournot …) than Cournot-Nash ones. The reversal of the standard rankings occurs when pricing strategies mimic collusive behaviour. …