Showing 1 - 10 of 24
We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity. A merger creates an internal money market that affects reserve holdings and induces financial cost advantages, but also withdraws liquidity from the interbank market. We assess changes in liquidity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497912
Modern antitrust engenders a possible conflict between public and private enforcement due to the central role of Leniency Programs. Damage actions may reduce the attractiveness of Leniency Programs for cartel participants if their cooperation with the competition authority increases the chance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011168913
collusion. To test this subtle prediction we implement in the laboratory an indefinitely repeated Cournot game with noisy price …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084106
Over the last decade a large body of economic research has emerged that has sought to empirically test the effectiveness of leniency policies as tools to enhance the detection, prosecution and deterrence of cartel conduct. This research has considerable potential value in assisting competition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010945036
We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity. A merger changes the distribution of liquidity shocks and creates an internal money market, leading to financial cost efficiencies and more precise estimates of liquidity needs. The merged banks...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958652
We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity. A merger creates an internal money market that affects reserve holdings and induces financial cost advantages, but also withdraws liquidity from the interbank market. Loan market competition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649090
I characterize the effects of empirically observed managerial incentives on long-run oligopolistic competition. When managers have a preference for smooth time-paths of profits – as revealed by the empirical literature on ‘income smoothing’ – manager-led firms can sustain collusive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667065
We model networks of relational (or implicit) contracts, exploring how sanctioning power and equilibrium conditions change under different network configurations and information transmission technologies. In our model, relations are the links, and the value of the network lies in its ability to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785887
We model networks of relational (or implicit) contracts, exploring how sanctioning power and equilibrium conditions change under different network configurations and information transmission technologies. In our model relations are the links, and the value of the network lies in its ability to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114333
The paper presents a theory of the anti-competitive effects of debt finance based on the interaction between capital structure, managerial incentives, and firms' ability to sustain collusive agreements. It shows that shareholders' commitments that reduce conflicts with debtholders - such as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012740710