We run a market experiment where subjects take the role of firms and can choose not only their price but also whether to present comparable offers. Firms are faced with artificial demand whereby consumers make mistakes in assessing the net value of products on the market. Some of those consumers...

Built on the location model, this paper studies the rivalry of two firms in an industry through two-part tariffs. It is found that kinky profit functions are responsible for the coincidence of imperfectly competitive equilibrium and cartelization outcome. A duopoly likely results in higher entry...

In this paper, a spatial (circular) model is used to endogenously determine product locations and prices when consumers have an elastic (linear) demand with a finite reservation price. I show that a symmetric two-stage Bertrand-Nash equilibrium requires maximal product differentiation....

The purpose of this paper is to test the nature of competition concerning price and capacity setting in the Norwegian airline industry after the deregulation in 1994. Did the two airlines, SAS and Braathens, compete on prices and capacities (competition), collude on prices and capacities...

We analyse the incidence of ad valorem and unit excise taxes in an oligopolistic industry with diffentiated products and price-setting (Bertrand) firms.

This paper considers the relative efficiency of ad valorem and unit selective sales taxes in imperfectly competitive market. We provide a simple proof of the proposition that ad valorem taxes are welfare-superior to unit taxes in the short run whenproduction costs are identical across firms.

The paper examines some issues linked to the integration of market power in general equilibrium. The first part reviews the different existing approaches: subjective and objective, in terms of quantities and in terms of prices. The second part presents a semi-competitive model, based on a sector...

We consider a homogenous good oligopoly with identical consumers who learn about prices either by (sequentially) visiting firms or by consulting a price agency who sells information about which firm charges the lowest price.

In this paper, a spatial (circular) model is used to endogenously determine product locations and prices when consumers have an elastic (linear) demand with a finite reservation price. I show that a symmetric two-stage Bertrand-Nash equilibrium requires maximal product differentiation....

Built on the location model, this paper studies the rivalry of two firms in an industry through two-part tariffs. It is found that kinky profit functions are responsible for the coincidence of imperfectly competitive equilibrium and cartelization outcome. A duopoly likely results in higher entry...