We run a market experiment where subjects take the role of firms and can choose not only their price but also whether to present comparable offers. Firms are faced with artificial demand whereby consumers make mistakes in assessing the net value of products on the market. Some of those consumers...

In this paper, a spatial (circular) model is used to endogenously determine product locations and prices when consumers have an elastic (linear) demand with a finite reservation price. I show that a symmetric two-stage Bertrand-Nash equilibrium requires maximal product differentiation....

The impact of competition on prices and wages in investigated using a panel of three-digit industries in the Dutch Manufacturing sector (1978-1991). Output prices are explaining using an oligopoly model, whereas wages are axplained through a bargaining model. The analysis reveals that market...

We analyse the incidence of ad valorem and unit excise taxes in an oligopolistic industry with diffentiated products and price-setting (Bertrand) firms.

This paper considers the relative efficiency of ad valorem and unit selective sales taxes in imperfectly competitive market. We provide a simple proof of the proposition that ad valorem taxes are welfare-superior to unit taxes in the short run whenproduction costs are identical across firms.

The paper examines some issues linked to the integration of market power in general equilibrium. The first part reviews the different existing approaches: subjective and objective, in terms of quantities and in terms of prices. The second part presents a semi-competitive model, based on a sector...

This paper considers a potential entrant that cannot enter without paying an avoidable cost and cannot commit toi that until after incumbent firms have committed to their output.

We consider a homogenous good oligopoly with identical consumers who learn about prices either by (sequentially) visiting firms or by consulting a price agency who sells information about which firm charges the lowest price.

Built on the location model, this paper studies the rivalry of two firms in an industry through two-part tariffs. It is found that kinky profit functions are responsible for the coincidence of imperfectly competitive equilibrium and cartelization outcome. A duopoly likely results in higher entry...

Built on the location model, this paper studies the rivalry of two firms in an industry through two-part tariffs. It is found that kinky profit functions are responsible for the coincidence of imperfectly competitive equilibrium and cartelization outcome. A duopoly likely results in higher entry...