The recent financial crisis teaches important lessons regarding the lender-of-last resort function. Large swap lines extended in 2007-08 from the Federal Reserve to other central banks show that the classic concept of a national last-resort lender fails to address key vulnerabilities in a...

Banking systems have rapidly grown to a point where, for many countries, bank assets amount to multiples of GDP. As a consequence, governments' capacities to provide stability-enhancing fiscal guarantees against systemic crises can no longer be taken for granted. As regulation of dynamic...

Banking systems have rapidly grown to a point where for many countries bank assets amount to multiples of GDP. As a consequence, governmentfs capacity to provide stability-enhancing fiscal guarantees against systemic crises can no longer be taken for granted. As regulation of dynamic financial...

Banking systems have rapidly grown to a point where for many countries bank assets amount to multiples of GDP. As a consequence, government’s capacity to provide stability-enhancing fiscal guarantees against systemic crises can no longer be taken for granted. As regulation of dynamic financial...

We argue that the fundamental cause of the financial crisis of 2007–2009 was that large, complex financial institutions ("LCFIs") took excessive leverage in the form of manufacturing tail risks that were systemic in nature and inadequately capitalized. We employ a set of headline facts about...

This paper makes a case that the global imbalances of the 2000s and the recent global financial crisis are intimately connected. Both have their origins in economic policies followed in a number of countries in the 2000s and in distortions that influenced the transmission of these policies...