We examine the effect of earnings surprises on changes in information asymmetry. We hypothesize and find that asymmetry is lower (higher) in the quarter following positive (negative) earnings surprises compared to firms that meet the consensus analyst earnings forecast. The relations between...

We examine the influence of the ex ante risk of class action securities litigation on firms' decisions to issue management earnings forecasts as well as the characteristics of those forecasts. We find that litigation risk is positively associated with the likelihood of issuing a forecast for...

We hypothesize that conference calls are voluntary disclosures that lead to long-term reductions in information asymmetry among equity investors. Cross-sectional and time-series tests show that the level of information asymmetry is negatively associated with conference call activity. We find...

We hypothesize that conference calls are voluntary disclosures that lead to long-term reductions in information asymmetry among equity investors. Both cross-sectional and time-series tests show that information asymmetry is negatively associated with conference call activity. In particular,...

We examine the effect of earnings surprises on changes in information asymmetry. We hypothesize and find that asymmetry is lower (higher) in the quarter following positive (negative) earnings surprises compared to firms that meet the consensus analyst earnings forecast. The relations between...

We examine the effect of earnings surprises on changes in information asymmetry. We hypothesize and find that asymmetry is lower (higher) in the quarter following positive (negative) earnings surprises compared to firms that meet the consensus analyst earnings forecast. The relations between...

This study examines how disclosure quality is related to the long-run level of information asymmetry. We examine two potential mechanisms through which disclosure quality is expected to reduce the long-run level of information asymmetry: (1) disclosure quality will alter the trading incentives...