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Knowledge Disclosure, Patents and Optimal Organization of Research and Development

Bhattacharya, Sudipto; Guriev, Sergei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development (R&D), in which one Research Unit (RU) with an innovative idea bargains to license her non-verifiable interim knowledge exclusively to one of two competing Development Units (DUs) via one of two alternative modes: an open sale...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124391

Knowledge disclosure, patents and optimal organization of research and development

Bhattacharya, Sudipto; Guriev, Sergei - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

We develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development (R&D), in which one Research Unit (RU) with an innovative idea bargains to license her nonverifiable interim knowledge exclusively to one of two competing Development Units (DUs) via one of two alternative modes: an Open sale...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745090

Knowledge Disclosure, Patents and Optimal Organization of Research and Development

Bhattacharya, Sudipto; Guriev, Sergei - Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics … - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005670680

Control Rights over Intellectual Property: Corporate Venturing and Bankruptcy Regimes

Bhattacharya, Sudipto; Guriev, Sergei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

downstream development unit, a buyer of the interim innovation, arise from its ability to prevent the upstream research unit from … the value of her innovation is low. By constraining the financial flexibility of the upstream unit vis-a-vis her choice …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788940