Several recent studies have shown that, when fiscal and monetary authorities play a Stackelberg game, central bank opacity has a fiscal disciplining effect in the sense that it induces the government to reduce taxes and public expenditures, leading hence to lower inflation and output...

In a Stackelberg equilibrium, central bank opacity has a fiscal disciplining effect in the sense that it induces the government to reduce taxes and public expenditures, leading hence to lower inflation and output distortions. This effect could disappear or be dominated by the direct effect of...

This paper examines monetary and fiscal interactions in a framework where the government worries about political costs of low institutional quality and central bank opacity acts as a disciplinary device leading the government to reduce distortionary taxes and public expenditures. Greater opacity...

This paper examines the issues of institutional quality and central bank transparency through the interaction of monetary and fiscal policies. We have found that the effects of transparency and corruption on macroeconomic performance and volatility depend on the relative importance of the...

Cet article étudie la stabilité macroéconomique lorsque la Banque Centrale intègre dans sa règle du taux d'intérêt optimale les cours boursiers. Nous montrons que lorsque la Banque Centrale a une forte aversion pour l'inflation en attribuant un poids important à l'objectif de l'inflation...

The effects of quantitative easing policy, which looks like a “helicopter dropping” of money, are quite complex. Implemented following a major crisis induced by the deflation of bubbles on asset prices, this policy creates redistributive effects in favour of financial and banking...

Using an aggregate dynamic macroeconomic model, we study the macroeconomic and financial stability under flexible inflation-targeting regime associated with intermediate monetary growth target. Central banks, using the inflation target as a communication and strong nominal anchoring device,...

We introduce Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAPs) in a New-Keynesian DSGE model that features distinct mortgage and corporate loan markets. We show that following a significant disruption of financial intermediation, central-bank purchases of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are uniformly less...

In this paper we examine the macroeconomic stability in a simple dynamic open economy model, in which monetary authorities adopt an flexible inflation-targeting regime in an environment with a liberalised capital account and flexible exchange rates. In this respect, inflation targeting is an...

Résumé: Une zone-cible du taux d’inflation comporte une borne supérieure et une borne inférieure clairement annoncées par les autorités monétaires. Ces dernières assurent la crédibilité de cette zone par des interventions ponctuelles sur les marchés financiers lorsque le taux...