Bayesian equilibria are characterized by means of consistency and one-person rationality in combination with non-emptiness or converse consistency. Moreover, strong and coalition-proof Bayesian equilibria of extended Bayesian games are introduced and it is seen that these notions can be...

This paper considers a refinement of equilibria for multicriteria games based on the perfectness concept of Selten (1975). Existence of perfect equilibrium points is shown and several characterizations are provided. Furthermore, contrary to the result for equilibria for multicriteria games, an...

In this paper we provide a characterization of the set of fall back equilibria for $$2 \times n$$ bimatrix games. Furthermore, for this type of games we discuss the relation between the set of fall back equilibria and the sets of perfect, proper and strictly perfect equilibria. In order to do...

The authors investigates refinements of two solutions, the saddle and the weak saddle, defined by Shapley (1964) for two-player zero-sum games. Applied to weak tournaments, the firsy refinement, the mixed saddle, is unique and gives us a new solution, generally lying between the GETCHA and...

This paper introduces the notion of protective equilibrium in the context of fin ite games in strategic form.It shows that for matrix games the set of protective equilibria equals the set of proper equilibria.Moreover, in the context of bima trix games, the notion of protective behaviour is used...