This paper studies the optimal linear pension scheme when society consists of rational and myopic individuals. Myopic individuals have, ex ante, a strong preference for the present even though, ex post, they would regret not to have saved enough. While rational and myopic persons share the same...

In a recent paper, Homburg and Richter have argued that with free mobility of labor within a common labor market there is a need to harmonize and even consolidate pay-as-you-go financed national public pension systems to reach an efficient allocation of labor. We show that with free and...

We study the design of retirement and disability policies and illustrate the often observed exit from the labor force of healthy workers through disability insurance schemes. In our model, two types of individuals, disabled and leisure-prone ones, have the same disutility for labor and cannot be...

Social insurance for the elderly is judged responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement. In a world of laissez-faire or in a first-best setting, there would be no such trend. However, when first-best instruments are not available, because health and productivity are not...

This paper studies the design of pension schemes in a society where fertility is endogenous and parents differ in their ability to raise children. In a world with perfect information, a pay-as-you-go social security system is characterized by equal pensions for all but different contributions...

In several OECD countries, public pay-as-you-go financed pension systems have undergone major reforms in which future retirement benefit promises have been scaled down. A consequence of these reforms is that especially in countries with a tight tax-benefit linkage, the retirement benefit claims...

It is now a commonplace that the unfunded public pension systems of many OECD countries will run into severe financing problems in the coming decades due to a dramatically increasing pensioner/worker ratio. While this diagnosis is completely undisputed, there is still a vigorous debate on the...

We identify several objectionable features of the German retirement benefit formula. Groups of insureds with higher than average life expectancy are subsidized by the rest of the members because the formula neglects differences in group-specific life expectancy. Moreover, undesirable long-run...

This paper studies the design of retirement and disability policies when individuals differ in both productivity and health. The second-best solution implies (downward) distortions in the (per-period) labor supply and in the choice of retirement age for some individuals, and lesser...

This paper studies the design of nonlinear social security schemes when individuals differ in productivity and in their degree of myopia. Myopic individuals may not save ‘‘enough’’ for their retirement. The welfare function is paternalistic: The rate of time preference of the farsighted...