In Braess paradox adding an extra resource, and therefore an extra available choice, enriches the complexity of the game from a dynamic perspective. The analysis of the cycles and the bifurcations helps to visualize how this complexity changes, in a quite new way with respect to what is provided...

This paper introduces and analyzes a model of supervised work group where subordinates decide how to exert their effort in complementary tasks while the supervisors decide incentives. Incentives may be a combination of individual and group-based ones. The optimality of incentives is analyzed...

Understanding what motivates and fosters collective actions has major implications in the regulation and design of public policies, in the governance and management of organizations and has long attracted the interests of scholars and practitioners in economics and business. If trust and...

This paper studies the profile of cooperation emerging in a context in which agents may choose to join one of two groups or stay on their own, in a world where similarity across peers matters. In particular, we investigate the role of heterogeneity in individual contributions, of the level of...