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Inequity Aversion in Tournaments
Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2003
We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696268
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Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition
Fluet, Claude; Demougin, Dominique - In: Economic Theory 17 (2001) 2, pp. 489-496
We provide a condition for ranking of information systems in agency problems. The condition has a straightforward economic interpretation in terms of the sensitivity of a cumulative distribution with respect to the agent's effort. The criterion is shown to be equivalent to the mean preserving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371157
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The first-order approach when the cost of effort is money
Fagart, Marie-Cécile; Fluet, Claude - In: Journal of Mathematical Economics 49 (2013) 1, pp. 7-16
We provide sufficient conditions for the first-order approach in the principal-agent problem when the agent’s utility has the nonseparable form u(y−c(a)) where y is the contractual payoff and c(a) is the money cost of effort. We first consider a decision-maker facing prospects which cost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011065449