Weekly repo auctions are the European Central Bank's most important policy instrument. Provided that banks bid seriously, these auctions should reveal useful information about banks' liquidity needs and the stance of monetary policy. However 1 as we show in this paper, the applied auction rules...

Until June 2000 the European Central Bank (ECB) used fixed rate tenders for its weekly repo auctions. A switch to variable rate tenders became necessary due to massive overbidding by banks. In this paper we introduce a stylized game among banks to investigate this overbidding phenomenon. Our...

Recently there has been much theoretical and experimental work on learning in games. However, learning usually means "learning about the strategic behavior of opponents" rather than "learning about the game" as such. In contrast, here we report on an experiment designed to test whether players...

We introduce a dynamic panel threshold model to estimate inflation thresholds for long-term economic growth. Advancing on Hansen (J Econom 93:345–368, <CitationRef CitationID="CR14">1999</CitationRef>) and Caner and Hansen (Econom Theory 20:813–843, <CitationRef CitationID="CR7">2004</CitationRef>), our model allows the estimation of threshold effects with panel data even in...</citationref></citationref>

This paper sheds new light on the impact of information risk and market stress on herding of institutional traders from both, a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Using numerical simulations of a herd model, we show that buy and sell herding intensity should increase with information...

Herd behavior is often viewed as a signicant threat for the stability and eciency of nancial markets. This paper sheds new light on the relevance of herd behavior for observed correlation of trades. We introduce numerical simulations of a herd model to derive theory-guided predictions regarding...