We investigate the relation between the proportion of total compensation received by CEOs from stock options and the accuracy and bias of analysts' earnings forecasts. We hypothesize that forecast accuracy decreases as the proportion of stock option pay increases. Higher proportions of stock...

We investigate the relations between changes in the precisions of public and private information and changes in market liquidity around earnings announcements. Increases in the precision of public information reduce information asymmetry, whereas increases in the precision of private information...

This study investigates whether bank managers use their discretion in estimating loan loss provisions to convey information about their banks' future prospects. Bank managers' propensities to signal their private information vary cross-sectionally because they face different conditions and have...

The retained earnings hypothesis predicts that stock distributions accounted for by reducing retained earnings are a more credible signal of managerial optimism than stock distributions that do not reduce retained earnings. This study examines the costs of false signaling that are a necessary...

This study investigates the implications of bank managers' discretion over their loan loss provision. It empirically assesses whether discretionary loan loss provision contains both signaling and income smoothing components. To do so, the study identifies different environments in which either...

The retained earnings hypothesis predicts that stock distributions accounted for by reducing retained earnings are a more credible signal of managerial optimism than stock distributions that do not reduce retained earnings. This study examines the costs of false signaling that are a necessary...

We examine whether and how managers use loan loss provisions to smooth income and to signal their private information about their banks' future prospects. Our paper highlights that the use of the loan loss provision to accomplish more than one objective gives rise to situation-specific costs and...

This study investigates whether bank managers use their discretion in estimating loan loss provisions to convey information about their banks' future prospects. Bank managers' propensities to signal their private information vary cross-sectionally because they face different conditions and have...

We examine the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on the extent of aggressive/conservative reporting behavior of public companies. SOX imposes considerably greater potential penalties on CEO/CFOs who engage in financial wrongdoing; therefore, risk averse managers are likely to report lower...

We examine the relationship between the quality of corporate governance and information asymmetry in the equity market around quarterly earnings announcements. We use the change in market liquidity (i.e., bid-ask spreads and depths) around the announcements as a proxy for information asymmetry....