The arm’s length principle states that the transfer price between two associated enterprises should be the price that would be paid for similar goods in similar circumstances by unrelated parties dealing at arm’s length with each other. This paper examines the effect of the arm’s length...

This paper presents the development of an equilibrium theory of vertical merger that incorporates strategic behaviors in the Hotelling-type location model for the purpose of considering the relationship between the strategies of downstream firms for product differentiation and vertical...

The arm's length principle states that the transfer price between two associated enterprises should be the price that would be paid for similar goods in similar circumstances by unrelated parties dealing at arm's length with each other. This paper examines the effect of the arm's length...

This paper studies the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination under oligopolistic competition with horizontal product differentiation. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare: the degree of substitution must be sufficiently...

The arm's length principle states that the transfer price between two associated enterprises should be the price that would be paid for similar goods in similar circumstances by unrelated parties dealing at arm's length with each other. This paper examines the effect of the arm's length...

When upstream firms compete in quantity and freely enter the input market, competition among downstream firms reduces the input price (the marginal cost of downstream firms). The industry profits of downstream firms competing in quantity can increase with the number of downstream firms.

We investigate a mixed market where a state-owned welfare-maximizing public firm competes against profit-maximizing private firms. We use a circular city model with quantity-setting competition. In contrast to a pure market case discussed by Pal (1998a), spatial agglomeration of private firms...

In linear-city models, if firms are allowed (not allowed) to locate outside the linear city, they engage in excessive (insufficient) R&D investments from the normative viewpoint. This implies that the feasible set of locations drastically affects their investments.

In general, the disclosure of know-how and technological knowledge could harm the disclosing firm. Firms, however, often share their know-how freely and yet enhance their profits. We provide a theoretical framework and a new insight into know-how disclosure. We consider a multiproduct...