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Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments

Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013

We provide an overview of experimental literature on contests and point out the two main phenomena observed in most contest experiments- (i) overbidding relative to the standard Nash equilibrium prediction and (ii) heterogeneous behavior of ex-ante symmetric contestants. Based on the sample of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817423

Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence

Shupp, Robert; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Schmidt, David; … - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013

potentially divisible resource. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three resource allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817382

The New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests

Irfanoglu, Zeynep B.; Mago, Shakun D.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2014

This experimental study compares sequential and simultaneous election contests. Consistent with the theory, we find evidence of the “New Hampshire effect” in the sequential contests, i.e., the winner of the first electoral battle wins the overall contest with much higher probability than the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884877

Resolving Conflicts by a Random Device

Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2011

We examine conflict resolution via a random device. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for a fixed prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may agree to allocate the prize by coin flip to avoid the costs of conflict. In equilibrium, risk-neutral agents with relatively...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323518

The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks

Kovenock, Dan; Roberson, Brian; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Krannert School of Management, Purdue University - 2010

This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender’s objective is diametrically opposed .We apply two benchmark contest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008728040

Facing Your Opponents: Social identification and information feedback in contests.

Mago, Shakun D.; Savikhin, Anya C.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in contests. Identifying subjects through photo display decreases efforts. Providing information feedback about others’ effort does not affect the aggregate effort levels but it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817374

Why Can’t We Be Friends? Entitlements, bargaining, and conflict.

Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817376

Multi-Battle Contests: An Experimental Study

Mago, Shakun D.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

This study examines behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi-battle contests. In simultaneous contests, subjects make positive bids in each battle 80% of the time and bids fall within the predicted boundaries. However, 35% of the time subjects make positive bids in only two,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817377

Limitations to Signaling Trust with All or Nothing Investments

Schniter, Eric; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy W. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013

Many economic interactions are characterized by “all or nothing” action spaces that may limit a demonstrable index of trust and, therefore, the propensity to reciprocate. In two experimental trust games, the action space governing investments was manipulated to examine the effects on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817379

You Can’t Put Old Wine in New Bottles: The Effect of Newcomers on Coordination in Groups

Sheremeta, Roman M.; McCarter, Matthew W. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013

of member change on performance? To answer these questions we conduct an experiment in which we investigate the effect of … first part of the experiment, and then two members of the group are replaced with new participants, and the newly formed … group plays the game for the second part of the experiment. Our results show that the arrival of newcomers decreases trust …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817394