We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in … largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is … disabled. Communication supports fims in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation. …

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they …

We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in … largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is … disabled. Communication supports firms in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation. …

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they …

firms. Communication is often abused for explicit agreements and this strongly reduces competition. …

firms. Communication is often abused for explicit agreements and this strongly reduces competition. …