Many empirical works addressed the nature of the relationship between economic growth and financial developments. Although these studies concede that they are interdependent, they have used single equations methods for estimation. In particular in the country specific studies the Granger...

This paper develops an extended version of the Solow (1956) growth model in which total factor productivity is assumed a function of two important externalities viz., learning by doing and openness to trade. Using this framework we show that these externalities have played an important role to...

This paper develops an endogenous growth ramework with externalities due to learning by doing and trade openness to show that these externalities are significant for 6 Asian countries. The estimated parameters of the augmented production functions are used to compute the steady state growth...

Two myths have harmed many economies throughout the world. One is the theory of absolute advantage of central planning over the market mechanism, and the other is the belief that efficient markets develop spontaneously and quickly enough if appropriate economic legislation is established....

One of the main obstacles for successful economic development is the formation of institutional traps, inefficient yet stable norms of behaviour. Domination of barter exchange, arrears, corruption and black market activities are examples of institutional traps that have hampered reforms in...

The theory of institutional traps, i.e. ineffective but stable institutions or behavior norms, is develope din connection with economic reforms. Mechanisms are described that cause a system to get into a trap and ways of going out of it are analyzed. Concepts of transformation costs and...

The Solow growth model is extended with an endogenous growth framework to estimate the effects of trade openness on the steady state growth rate (SSGR). Estimates of the augmented production functions are used to compute the SSGRs for Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, India and Thailand. That good...

Any legislative framework is likely to generate different institutions or norms of behavior which the legislator occasionally could have never foreseen. I suggested a general pattern, on which inefficient, if stable, norms or institutions called institutional traps would form.