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This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (MESSES) in Robinstein's alternative-offers, infinite- horizon bargaining game.
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This paper studies a population of agents, each of whom can be either an Altruist or an Egoist. Altruists confer benefits on others at a cost to themselves. Altruism is thus a strictly dominated strategy and cannot survive if agents are rational best-responders. We assume that agents choose...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443416
This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the learning process through which equilibrium is achieved. The differential equations derived from models of interactive learning typically have stationary states that are not isolated. Instead, Nash...
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This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (MESSES) in Robinstein's alternative-offers, infinite- horizon bargaining game.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443493
We show that a strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasi-perfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequence of supporting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit.
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