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Addressing cross-border environmental displacement: when can international treaties help?

Subramanian, Narayan; Urpelainen, Johannes - In: International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law … 14 (2014) 1, pp. 25-46

Environmental degradation is increasingly causing cross-border displacement of people, but countries have formed no treaties to facilitate collaboration on the issue. When is such collaboration feasible, and how should environmental displacement treaties be designed? We present a game-theoretic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010848100

Geoengineering and global warming: a strategic perspective

Urpelainen, Johannes - In: International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law … 12 (2012) 4, pp. 375-389

sunlight from planet Earth and remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. In this article, I develop a strategic theory of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010848116

Does It Pay to Play? How Bargaining Shapes Donor Participation in the Funding of Environmental Protection

Bayer, Patrick; Urpelainen, Johannes - In: Strategic Behavior and the Environment 4 (2014) 3, pp. 263-290

Multilateral funding for global environmental protection, such as biodiversity conservation, requires donor participation. When are donors willing to participate? We examine a game-theoretic model of multilateral funding for environmental projects in developing countries. Donors must first...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010885176

The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions: Volume 2

Shubik, Martin - The MIT Press

dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and … macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form. The approach involves a search for minimal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233383

The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions: Volume 1

Shubik, Martin - The MIT Press

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005237360

Game Theory. Models of Strategic Behavior and Nuclear Deterrence

Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1987

This essay offers an exposition of the potential uses of game theoretic reasoning and mathematical models in the study of the prevention of nuclear war.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249153

The Use of Simple Games to Illustrate Concepts and to Provide Experimental Evidence

Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1985

This paper is devoted to a discussion of several simple experimental games used in a series of lectures on game theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249181

The Uses, Value and Limitation of Game Theoretic Methods in Defense Analysis

Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1985

The central contribution of game theory to defense analysis has been a language for the understanding of how to … this discussion that two fundamentally different classes of application of game theory to problems in defense have emerged …. The first is the application of two-person zero sum game theory to military, primarily tactical situations which for the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249231

How Does Democratic Accountability Shape International Cooperation?

Urpelainen, Johannes - In: Conflict Management and Peace Science 29 (2012) 1, pp. 28-55

In democratic societies, citizens can hold their government politically accountable for the consequences of international cooperation. Can democratic accountability shape international cooperation under strategic interdependence, and if so, to what effect? I show formally that citizens can endow...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009654074

Domestic Reform as a Rationale for Gradualism in International Cooperation

Urpelainen, Johannes - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 23 (2011) 3, pp. 400-427

Gradualism is common in international cooperation, as states begin with limited cooperation and choose more ambitious targets slowly over time. However, most models of international cooperation are static and thus cannot explain gradualism. I show that when states can implement domestic reforms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294416