Bayesian equilibria are characterized by means of consistency and one-person rationality in combination with non-emptiness or converse consistency. Moreover, strong and coalition-proof Bayesian equilibria of extended Bayesian games are introduced and it is seen that these notions can be...

In this paper we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures or communication graphs between players in a superadditive TU game. For each cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of...

This paper considers a refinement of equilibria for multicriteria games based on the perfectness concept of Selten (1975). Existence of perfect equilibrium points is shown and several characterizations are provided. Furthermore, contrary to the result for equilibria for multicriteria games, an...

Advances in information technology increasingly allow firms to identify expensive, high-cost customers, who are not only individually less profitable for firms but also raise the average marginal cost incurred by firms and thus impose a negative externality on inexpensive customers. Should...

Commercial open source software (COSS) products--privately developed software based on publicly available source code--represent a rapidly growing, multibillion-dollar market. A unique aspect of competition in the COSS market is that many open source licenses require firms to make certain...

Environmental degradation is increasingly causing cross-border displacement of people, but countries have formed no treaties to facilitate collaboration on the issue. When is such collaboration feasible, and how should environmental displacement treaties be designed? We present a game-theoretic...

Multilateral funding for global environmental protection, such as biodiversity conservation, requires donor participation. When are donors willing to participate? We examine a game-theoretic model of multilateral funding for environmental projects in developing countries. Donors must first...

In democratic societies, citizens can hold their government politically accountable for the consequences of international cooperation. Can democratic accountability shape international cooperation under strategic interdependence, and if so, to what effect? I show formally that citizens can endow...