Showing 1 - 10 of 53
Bayesian equilibria are characterized by means of consistency and one-person rationality in combination with non-emptiness or converse consistency. Moreover, strong and coalition-proof Bayesian equilibria of extended Bayesian games are introduced and it is seen that these notions can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011087096
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011087201
In this paper we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures or communication graphs between players in a superadditive TU game. For each cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091161
This paper considers a refinement of equilibria for multicriteria games based on the perfectness concept of Selten (1975). Existence of perfect equilibrium points is shown and several characterizations are provided. Furthermore, contrary to the result for equilibria for multicriteria games, an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092242
Environmental degradation is increasingly causing cross-border displacement of people, but countries have formed no treaties to facilitate collaboration on the issue. When is such collaboration feasible, and how should environmental displacement treaties be designed? We present a game-theoretic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010848100
sunlight from planet Earth and remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. In this article, I develop a strategic theory of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010848116
Multilateral funding for global environmental protection, such as biodiversity conservation, requires donor participation. When are donors willing to participate? We examine a game-theoretic model of multilateral funding for environmental projects in developing countries. Donors must first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010885176
In democratic societies, citizens can hold their government politically accountable for the consequences of international cooperation. Can democratic accountability shape international cooperation under strategic interdependence, and if so, to what effect? I show formally that citizens can endow...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009654074
Gradualism is common in international cooperation, as states begin with limited cooperation and choose more ambitious targets slowly over time. However, most models of international cooperation are static and thus cannot explain gradualism. I show that when states can implement domestic reforms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294416
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009403311