Similar Search Results

Does It Pay to Play? How Bargaining Shapes Donor Participation in the Funding of Environmental Protection

Bayer, Patrick; Urpelainen, Johannes - In: Strategic Behavior and the Environment 4 (2014) 3, pp. 263-290

Multilateral funding for global environmental protection, such as biodiversity conservation, requires donor participation. When are donors willing to participate? We examine a game-theoretic model of multilateral funding for environmental projects in developing countries. Donors must first...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010885176

Technology investment, bargaining, and international environmental agreements

Urpelainen, Johannes - In: International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law … 12 (2012) 2, pp. 145-163

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010558296

The compromise value for NTU-games

Borm, Peter; Keiding, H.; McLean, R.P.; Oortwijn, S.; … - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092802

Compromise values in cooperative game theory

Tijs, S.H.; Otten, G.J.M. - Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011087133

van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M..; Potters, J.A.M.; Tijs, S.H.; … - Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011087137

A note on the characterization of the compromise value

Borm, Peter; Otten, G.J.M.; Tijs, S.H. - Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011087156