In this experiment, we endogenize the choice of which contribution scheme is implemented in a public goods game. We investigate three rule-based contribution schemes. In a first step, players agree on a common group provision level using the principle of the smallest common denominator....

We investigate how burden sharing rules may impact the voluntary provision of a public good which generates heterogeneous benefits to agents. We compare different rule-based contribution schemes that are based on the principle of the smallest common denominator: all agents can suggest a minimum...

In a laboratory experiment, the voluntary provision of public goods is investigated when there is probabilistic uncertainty about the monetary return from production of the public good. After group members make their provision decisions, the return is drawn from an exogenously determined...

Studies have shown that there are differences in cooperative behavior across countries. Furthermore, differences in the use of and the reaction to the introduction of a norm enforcement mechanism have recently been documented in cross-cultural studies. We present data that prove that stark...

Some peer punishment technologies may bias experimental results in unwanted ways. A critical parameter to consider in the design is the “fine-to-fee†ratio, which measures the income reduction for the targeted subject relative to the cost for the subject who requested the punishment....