The main challenges currently faced by most central banks are generated by the effects of the economic and financial crisis. Thus, at the national, European and international level there is a trend of changing the economic governance structures and improving the regulatory and supervisory...

Since the international financial crisis, the external environment was an important source of risks and uncertainties, the banking and financial markets of most of the states were marked by successive waves of turbulence, central banks reverted the task of ensuring financial stability to the...

The goal of the paper is to define the issue of central banking in the rule of law context in the Czech Republic. The paper deals both with the legislative framework during the creation of Czechoslovak sovereign monetary policy after the year 1918 and legislative framework of modern central...

The paper deals with G. Rudebusch’s paper Federal Reserve Interest Rate Targeting, Rational Expectations and the Term Structure published in Journal of Monetary Economics in 1995. I define main resources of the study, discuss the most important parts of Rudebusch’s paper and present key...

The implications of central bank collateral requirements for the monetary policy transmission mechanism and the working of the money market have often been neglected. Such implications, however, have clearly manifested during the course of the 2007-2009 crisis. As liquidity was vanishing in the...

In this paper, we test whether public preferences for price stability (obtained from the Eurobarometer survey) were actually reflected in the interest rates set by eight central banks. We estimate augmented Taylor (1993) rules for the period 1976Q2–1994Q1 using the dynamic GMM estimator. We...

A noteworthy characteristic of empirical studies on the economic uncertainty index is that very few published papers depend on normative analysis. Therefore, normative analysis cannot be used to refute the precision of the economic uncertainty index; the lack of precision is simply the outcome...

The language of discretion offers little information about monetary policy beyond the assurance that policymakers always “do the right thing at the right time”. This language renders problematic the reconciliation of central bank independence with accountability. Monetary policymakers should...