This paper identifies tax factors in 21 developing countries that have an impact on foreign direct investment flows. It categorizes those factors into issues associated with tax coordination; tax rates and rate structures; and composition of the tax base. Recent actions by countries reveal no...

This paper studies the impact of a government's efficiency on the taxation policy of a state. Namely, we claim that the countries are different both in the way they tax capital and the way they spend the collected revenue. We build a model of 2 countries competing for foreign investment,...

Rent-sharing between firm owners and workers is a robust empirical finding. If workers bargain with firms, information on the actual surplus is essential. When the firm can use profit shifting to create private information on the surplus, it can thereby reduce its wage bill. We study how rent...

Firms generating larger surpluses on average pay higher wages. We study the effect of this rent-sharing between firms and workers on international tax competition. In our model, firms in a large country can shift surplus to a tax haven. In the benchmark case firms only have a tax incentive for...

This paper derives welfare equivalence of double taxation rules in a tax competition model with discriminatory home taxes and the ability to finance subsidiary operations with host country capital. For a more general model, we provide sufficient conditions on the number of host sectors and...

This paper analyzes tax competition when welfare maximizing jurisdictions levy source-based corporate taxes and multinational enterprises choose tax-efficient capital-to-debt ratios. Under separate accounting, multinationals shift debt from low-tax to high-tax countries. The Nash equilibrium of...

This paper explores the effects of tax provisions aimed at restricting multinationals’ tax planning on foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a unique dataset which allows us to observe the worldwide activities of a large panel of multinational firms, we test how limitations of interest tax...

In this paper, we provide an explanation of why privatization may attract foreign investors interested in entering a regional market. Privatization turns the formerly-public firm into a less aggressive competitor since profit- maximizing output is lower than the welfare-maximizing one. The...

Oligopoly is empirically prevalent in the industries where MNEs operate and national governments compete with fiscal inducements for their FDI projects. Despite this, existing formal treatments of fiscal competition generally focus on the polar cases of perfect competition and monopoly. We...

Tax incentives offered to attract firms engaged in foreign direct investment are often tied to performance requirements such as domestic content restrictions. The tax competition literature has repeatedly shown that competition between municipalities for mobile firms tends to drive taxes to low...