We analyse the possibility of successful industry self-regulation in terms of the strategic interactions between industry members and government. In particular, this article presents a game-theoretic typology of generic self-regulatory scenarios and evaluates these in terms of the resulting...

The current international tax system diverges greatly from a theoretically ‘‘optimal’’ tax system. One reason for this discrepancy may be that politicians strive for other objectives rather than making tax rules that comply with the theoretical concepts of optimal taxation. In this...

Bayesian equilibria are characterized by means of consistency and one-person rationality in combination with non-emptiness or converse consistency. Moreover, strong and coalition-proof Bayesian equilibria of extended Bayesian games are introduced and it is seen that these notions can be...

In this paper we consider the location of the eigenvalues of the composite matrix ( -A S1 S2 ) ( Q1 At 0 ) ( Q2 0 At ) , where the matrices Si and Qi are assumed to be semi-positive definite. Two interesting observations, which are not or only partially mentioned in literature before, challenge...

In this paper we characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of a location-then-price game where firms first choose locations and after that compete for prices in two subsequent periods. Locations are thus seen as long term commitments. There are two types of consumers, each with different...