Similar Search Results

Hwang, Sung-Ha; Bowles, Samuel - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 83 (2012) 3, pp. 330-341

cooperation may be less than additive. Using a utility function embodying both reciprocity and altruism we show that unconditional … altruism attenuates the punishment motive and thus may reduce the level of punishment inflicted on defectors, resulting in … lower levels of contribution. Increases in altruism may also reduce the level of benefits from the public project net of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594637

What norms trigger punishment?

Carpenter, Jeffrey; Matthews, Peter - In: Experimental Economics 12 (2009) 3, pp. 272-288

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005029349

Strategic reward and altruistic punishment support cooperation in a public goods game experiment

Choi, Jung-Kyoo; Ahn, T.K. - In: Journal of Economic Psychology 35 (2013) C, pp. 17-30

We compare the effects of and the motivations behind voluntary punishment and reward in a finitely repeated public goods game. Our experimental results show that (1) the level of cooperation is indistinguishable between the punishment and reward treatments when group membership does not change,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662463

Gunning for efficiency with third party enforcement in threshold public goods

Andreoni, James; Gee, Laura - In: Experimental Economics 18 (2015) 1, pp. 154-171

When public goods can only be provided when donations cross a minimum threshold, this creates an advantage in that Pareto Efficient outcomes can be Nash Equilibria. Despite this, experiments have shown that groups struggle to coordinate on one of the many efficient equilibria. We apply a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011241964

State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods

Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - In: Experimental Economics 18 (2015) 1, pp. 38-65

We investigate the endogenous formation of sanctioning institutions supposed to improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. Our paper parallels Markussen et al. (Rev Econ Stud 81:301–324, <CitationRef CitationID="CR24">2014</CitationRef>) in that our experimental subjects vote over formal versus informal sanctions, but...</citationref>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011241969

Voluntary contributions with redistribution: The effect of costly sanctions when one person's punishment is another's reward

Page, Talbot; Putterman, Louis; Garcia, Bruno - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 95 (2013) C, pp. 34-48

We introduce new treatments of a voluntary contribution mechanism with opportunities to punish in order to see how contributions, punishments and earnings change when punishment is in the form of fines the punisher distributes to other members of her group. The linked punishment-reward set up is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719265

Social background, cooperative behavior, and norm enforcement

Kocher, Martin; Martinsson, Peter; Visser, Martine - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81 (2012) 2, pp. 341-354

Studies have shown that there are differences in cooperative behavior across countries. Furthermore, differences in the use and the reaction on the introduction of a norm enforcement mechanism have been documented in cross-cultural studies, recently. We present data which prove that stark...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573033

Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision

Andreoni, James; Gee, Laura K. - In: Journal of Public Economics 96 (2012) 11, pp. 1036-1046

This paper compares two methods to encourage socially optimal provision of a public good. We compare the efficacy of vigilante justice, as represented by peer-to-peer punishment, to delegated policing, as represented by the “hired gun” mechanism, to deter free riding and improve group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011056154

Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?

Cinyabuguma, Matthias; Page, Talbot; Putterman, Louis - In: Experimental Economics 9 (2006) 3, pp. 265-279

of voluntary punishment. In our experiment, allowing punishment of punishing behaviors reduces punishment of high …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005809912

Third-party punishment and social norms

Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - EconWPA - 2004

We examine the characteristics and relative strength of third-party sanctions in a series of experiments. We hypothesize that egalitarian distribution norms and cooperation norms apply in our experiments, and that third parties, whose economic payoff is unaffected by the norm violation, may be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125599