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We report an experiment on two treatments of an ultimatum minigame.In one treatment, responders' reactions are hidden …
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"One of the successes in contemporary social science is the development and proliferation of game theory. For a wide … range of phenomena, game theory produces enormous insight into the strategic interaction of individuals. Its greatest power …, information aggregation or when confronting large-scale social dilemmas. However, as Ostrom (1998) reminds us, game theory also …
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In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure whose equilibria converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the...
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The present analysis addresses the apparently critical issue of circulation of wealth in society. Three actors play the game of welfare-related taxation. The first actor, in the role of Negotiator No.1, stands up for citizens’ legal and moral rights to primary needs. The second actor, in the...
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own share of the endowment between consumption and investment. We conduct an experiment to assess the performance of these …
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We consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation is fixed on the part of the plaintiffs and shared among the members of a suing coalition. By settling and dropping out of the coalition, a plaintiff therefore creates a negative externality on the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739656
Consider a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can invest in a public good. Should the government or the NGO own the public project? In an incomplete contracting framework with split-the-difference bargaining, Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party who values the public good most...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084400