This paper, instead of focusing on agency cost, analyzes the role of risk-sharing under problems of enforceability (default) to explain the optimal determination of capital structure. Optimal contract structure presents equity and debt.

We base a contracting theory for a start-up firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable effort, and renegotiable contracts. Two essential restrictions on simple contracts are imposed: the entrepreneur must be given limited liability, and the investor's earnings must not decrease in...

We consider a model in which the principal-agent relation between inside shareholders and the management affects the firm value.We study the effect of financing the project with risky debt in changing the incentive for a risk-neutral shareholder (the principal) to implement the project-value...

The paper reviews the evolution in insurance economics over the past 25 years, by first recalling the situation in 1973, then presenting the developments and new approaches which flourished since then. The paper argues that these developments were only possible because steady advances were made...

This article examines, under the Dual Theory of Choice (Yaari (1987)), the classical results and their extensions on self-insurance, self-protection and market insurance obtained by Ehrlich and Becker (1972) under the expected utility hypothesis. In particular, background risk, non-reliability,...

Severe natural catastrophes in the early nineties have brought about a lack of financial capacity in the catastrophe line of the global reinsurance market. The finance industry reacted to this situation by issuing innovative products designed to spread the excess risk more widely among...

This paper investigates policyholder protection schemes in OECD member countries and selected non-OECD countries. It is selective in its scope: it examines the rationale for a policyholder protection scheme; the relationship between certain design features and moral hazard; the role of a...

This discussion paper has led to a publication in <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001429211200044X">'European Economic Review'</A>, 56(4), 669-90.<P>We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance...</p></a>

This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's dynamic risk (ex ante moral hazard) and claim (ex post moral hazard) choices and Dutch longitudinal micro data. We use the theory to characterize the heterogeneous dynamic changes in incentives...

The future course of old-age mortality is of great importance to public sector expenditures in countries where old-age programs, such as Social Security and Medicare in the US, account for large fractions of the public budget. This paper argues that the competitive market prices of motality...